A critical analysis of whether allowing directors to implement anti-takeover defences is beneficial for all corporate constituencies
Author | : Thomas Böhm |
Publisher | : GRIN Verlag |
Total Pages | : 31 |
Release | : 2019-06-19 |
ISBN-13 | : 9783668962699 |
ISBN-10 | : 3668962693 |
Rating | : 4/5 (93 Downloads) |
Download or read book A critical analysis of whether allowing directors to implement anti-takeover defences is beneficial for all corporate constituencies written by Thomas Böhm and published by GRIN Verlag. This book was released on 2019-06-19 with total page 31 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Essay from the year 2018 in the subject Business economics - General, grade: A, University of Edinburgh (Edinburgh Law School), course: Corporation Law and Economics, language: English, abstract: This essay examines the question whether allowing directors to implement anti-takeover defences is beneficial for all corporate constituencies. Beginning with the classification of the topic in the law and economics context of the market for corporate control in Chapter 2, I will briefly outline in Chapter 3 the scenarios in which anti-takeover defences usually come into operation, namely hostile takeovers. Chapter 4 presents the most common anti-takeover defences and sets out the legal framework to what extent directors are permitted to adopt such defences in accordance with the applicable law. A distinction is made between UK and US law, with the latter focussing on Delaware law, where more than a half of all US publicly traded corporations are established. The Delaware Court of Chancery and Supreme Court have developed an extraordinary body of jurisprudence concerning corporate takeovers and anti-takeover defences. Chapter 5 points out potential impacts on the various constituencies of a company and deals with the fact why their interests have to be regarded in the takeover context. Finally, Chapter 6 critically evaluates anti-takeover defences from different stakeholder perspectives and concludes that these are not beneficial for all corporate constituencies, but for directors only.